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THE NEW MADISON APPROACH TO 
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 
Anita Alanko* 
Imagine a world where intellectual property law and antitrust law live in 
perfect harmony, supporting each other’s goals to foster a rich competitive 
economy with incentives to innovate for the betterment of society.1 Makan 
Delrahim, assistant attorney general of the antitrust division at the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”), recently announced “A New Madison Approach” as his 
vision of antitrust enforcement to achieve a world that supports both the 
innovators and those who use innovations through patent licensing.2 Broadly, 
Delrahim advocates strong patent rights to encourage the efforts of both 
innovators and implementers in the context of standard setting organizations 
(“SSOs”) and the licensing of patented technology.3 This is a shift from past 
                                                          
* Anita Alanko holds a J.D. from The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of 
Law. She acknowledges with appreciation helpful comments by Professor William E. 
Kovacic of the George Washington Law School and Professor Marshall J. Breger of the 
Columbus School of Law. She is employed as a patent examiner at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office. The views and comments expressed herein are solely the opinion of 
the author, do not reflect the performance of duties in the author’s official capacity, and are 
not endorsed by, nor should be construed as, any viewpoint official or unofficial of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office. The author confirms to the best of her 
knowledge that no information contained herein is privileged, confidential, or classified. 
 
 1 Proposing a hypothetical as a play on words found in case law, see United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1981) (“There is an obvious tension 
between the patent laws and antitrust laws. One body of law creates and protects monopoly 
power while the other seeks to proscribe it.”). 
 2 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, Address Before 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 16, 2018) (to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, there is no “Old Madison Approach” and the “New Madison” title is inspired by 
the writings of President James Madison reflecting support for strong patent protection). 
 3 Id.; Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” 
Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1383, 1383 
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antitrust scholarship, and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Commissioner 
Terrell Sweeney quickly disagreed with a basic premise of the New Madison 
Approach.4 Shortly after Delrahim announced this approach, Commissioner 
Sweeney wrote that the FTC should “not abdicate its antitrust enforcement 
mission in this area” of patent hold-up.5 
The New Madison Approach has four premises. First, patent hold-up is not 
an antitrust problem.6 If an entity makes a commitment to license on fair and 
reasonable terms, but fails to do so, contract or common law remedies are 
available.7 Second, SSOs should better protect against patent hold-out to ensure 
maximum incentives to innovate.8 The New Madison Approach urges that 
implementer hold-out is a greater hindrance to innovation than innovator hold-
up, and the role of antitrust law is to ensure that both innovators and 
implementers do not harm competition by concerted action in violation of 
antitrust law.9 Third, patent holder injunction rights should be protected and not 
limited.10 Patent holders have the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing into the United States the invention.11 
Therefore, a patent holder has the right to exclude by seeking an injunction, and 
to limit this ability of a patent holder allows for potential abuse by the 
implementer.12 Fourth, a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a valid 
patent should be per se legal.13 An inventor should not be forced to license to a 
competitor.14 
The lofty goal of intellectual property law and antitrust law living in perfect 
                                                          
n.1 (2017) (explaining that innovators bring innovation to industry, implementers 
manufacture or commercialize products, and an implementer may also be an innovator). 
 4 TERRELL MCSWEENY, HOLDING THE LINE ON PATENT HOLDUP: WHY ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT MATTERS 1 (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/1350033/mcsweeny_-_the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-18.pdf. 
 5 Id. at 6. 
 6 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2. 
 7 Id.; Phillip B.C. Jones, Violation of a Patent License Restriction: Breach of Contract 
or Patent Infringement?, 33 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 225, 227 (1993) (describing the protection 
of patent rights by federal statutory law or state contract law). 
 8 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2 (discussing that hold-out is when implementers do not take a license and 
practice efficient breach). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
 12 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2 (noting that implementers have the incentive to infringe if injunctions are not 
available). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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harmony is not easily achieved. There are passionate views on both sides of the 
debate, and it appears that the two leading competition enforcement agencies in 
the United States have differing views.15 
This Comment traces the development and reasons two important competition 
agencies can reach differing opinions by reviewing the structure of the agencies, 
patent statutes, and case law. Furthermore, this Comment will offer an opinion 
on which approach should be followed. In Part I, this Comment will discuss the 
goals of the relevant antitrust laws, the overlapping authority of the DOJ and the 
FTC, and how politics can influence their decision whether or not to pursue an 
antitrust violation. Next, the roles of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (“USPTO”) and the United States International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”) will be described because they contribute to the relevant dialogue. The 
goals of the intellectual property system and the roles of an innovator and 
implementer will also be analyzed. The end of Part I will explain the standard 
essential patent, patent hold-up, and patent hold-out as they relate to the New 
Madison Approach. 
Section II addresses the shift in policy proposed by the New Madison 
Approach. This section will explore the views of supporters of the Madison 
Approach, as well as examine the viewpoints of those who oppose this approach. 
There will also be a discussion about how these issues are handled in other 
jurisdictions. 
Finally, Section III analyzes the New Madison Approach. Ultimately, 
intellectual property law and antitrust law can work together, but it requires a 
flexible approach in order for markets to decide the winners and losers in 
standards and technology. Having a variety of remedies available, including 
injunctions, ensures that parties will act reasonably. A thorough analysis and 
testing of the New Madison Approach can develop clear policy and guidance. 
Because of the inherently unpredictable time frame of innovation, creating 
new products demands flexibility. Antitrust law should remember this need for 
flexibility when addressing patent hold-up and hold-out, injunctions, and 
unilateral refusals to license. The DOJ and FTC must work together so that this 
country can have a strong patent system that ultimately benefits the public. 
                                                          
 15 Kate Gehl et al., DOJ and FTC Signal Shifts in Antitrust Enforcement of Essential 
Patent Disputes, JDSUPRA (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/doj-and-ftc-
signal-shifts-in-antitrust-97023/. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE RELEVANT LAW AND TERMS OF ART 
A. Antitrust Law: Its Enforcers and Related Government Agencies 
Antitrust law in the U.S. first started because large firms controlled the 
markets for basic goods, such as oil, sugar, and tobacco, by using “trusts.”16 The 
Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 and states, “Every contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
amount the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”17 
The broad terms of Section 1 of the Sherman Act are seen in other antitrust 
statutes, and the interpretation of them has caused differing opinions.18 The 
debate at hand is created by the various goals and perspectives on antitrust law 
that an enforcement agency or public enforcer can hold.19 
Complicating the matter that enforcers may have different goals and 
perspectives is the fact that there are overlapping authorities who enforce 
antitrust law, in addition to private rights of action.20 The two main competition 
authorities are the DOJ and FTC.21 State attorneys general also are public 
                                                          
 16 ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 1 (3d ed. 2017); Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the 
Origins of Antitrust Legislation 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 2316 (2013) (describing the 
1882 Standard Oil Trust in which trust beneficiaries gave assets to the Standard Oil 
Company in return for stocks, and beneficiaries gave their stock to a board of trustees to be 
held in trust for a Standard Oil Trust certificate; trustees controlled the operations of the 
various Standard Oil Companies). 
 17 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 § 1 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1 (2012)). 
 18 Barak Orbach, Foreword: Antitrust’s Pursuit of Purpose, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151, 
2152–55 (2013) (discussing perspectives such as the Borkean, Original Intent, Consumer 
Welfare, Anti-Trust, Consumer Surplus, Total Surplus and Competition perspectives); see 
Albert Allen Foer & Arthur Durst, The Multiple Goals of Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 
494, 502 (2018) (discussing the consumer welfare model and suggesting a goal based on 
competition and cooperation); see generally, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., 
ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL (5th ed. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761166/ 
download (listing antitrust statutes enforced by the Department of Justice); see also Statutes 
Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/statutes (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (listing statutes enforced by the Federal 
Trade Commission). 
 19 David A. Hyman and William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, 
and the Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2173–74 (2013). 
 20 GAVIL ET AL., supra note 16, at 62–63 (describing enforcement by the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the attorneys general of the fifty states, and 
aggrieved individuals). 
 21 See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law 
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last updated Oct. 2019) (showing the U.S. 
International Trade Commission can also address unfair competition, but that is not a focus 
2020] New Madison Approach to Antitrust Law and IP Law 223 
enforcers of antitrust law. Private parties can pursue claims before the ITC when 
goods are imported into the United States.22 Exclusion orders of the ITC are 
enforced by U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.23 
The antitrust division of the DOJ is charged with antitrust enforcement.24 The 
assistant attorney general for the antitrust division is appointed by the president 
and confirmed by the Senate.25 As the DOJ is part of the executive branch, the 
assistant attorney general is a political appointee who can be removed without 
cause at any time.26 The DOJ performs both civil and criminal enforcement 
under the antitrust statutes and offers guidance to the business community with 
respect to antitrust laws.27 
The FTC and the FTC Act were created and enacted in response to a perceived 
deficiency in enforcement of the Sherman Act.28 Section 5 of the FTC Act 
declares as unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”29 The FTC 
has five commissioners, each appointed by the president, by and with the advice 
of the Senate, and no more than three may be of the same political party.30 This 
bipartisan commission also includes term limits on each commissioner of seven 
years.31 The president also appoints from the five commissioners one who serves 
as chair, and as such the chair usually changes when a new president is 
appointed.32 While each commissioner, including the chair, only gets one vote 
on matters, the chair can influence the direction in which the commission is 
taken.33 
                                                          
of this comment). 
 22 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 23 19 C.F.R. § 12.39(b) (2012). 
 24 See ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 18, at I-2 (stating that the mission of 
the Antitrust Division is “the promotion and maintenance of competition in the American 
economy”). 
 25 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 506 (2012). 
 26 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 12 (2d 
ed. 2014); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, DOJ CIVIL ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE MANUAL 12 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing actions that can be seen as politically 
motivated). 
 27 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.40–0.41 (listing the functions of the antitrust division). 
 28 FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, supra note 26, at 1–3; Marc Winerman, 
The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 
ANTITRUST L. J. 1, 13 (2003) (describing the influence of the Standard Oil decision 
announcing the rule of reason, declarations that “The Trusts Have Won”, and other 
influences leading to the creation of the FTC). 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
 30 Id. § 41. 
 31 Id. 
 32 FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, supra note 26, at 67–68. 
 33 Id. at 68–69. 
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The DOJ and FTC have overlapping authority and work together through a 
process of “clearance.”34 They also collaborate to issue guidance and help firms 
predict when behavior could be anticompetitive, even though each case is fact-
specific.35 They have jointly issued “Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of 
Intellectual Property” that provide helpful guidance to consider in the area of 
patent licensing.36 
Each state and the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have an office of 
the attorney general.37 State laws allow attorneys general to sue on behalf of their 
constituents in state and federal courts using either state antitrust statutes or 
federal statutes.38 Multistate litigation can help reduce costs of enforcement 
through cost sharing arrangements and deputization of staff attorneys from one 
state to litigate in other states as assistant attorneys general.39 As demonstrated 
in one example, the attorney general of New York successfully sued a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer, to enjoin its efforts to force patients to “product-
hop” from one form of a drug with a shorter patent term to a different form of 
the drug with a longer patent term.40 The state attorneys general also have an 
interest in protecting their state’s residents from patent related antitrust 
violations. 
The USPTO issues U.S. patents and registers federal trademarks.41 As part of 
the most recent patent reform, the America Invents Act (“AIA”) allows the 
Patent Trial Appeal Board to review the patentability of claims under inter 
partes review (“IPR”) based on the petition of a third party who seeks to 
invalidate a patent.42 This new IPR procedure has been used to invalidate patents 
                                                          
 34 DOJ CIVIL ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, supra note 26, at 49, 55–
62 (discussing how through clearance, an enforcement agency gains jurisdiction based on 
agreements between the DOJ and FTC). 
 35 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE 
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/ 
download. 
 36 Id. 
 37 NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL POWERS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 7 (Emily Myers ed., 4th ed. 2018). 
 38 See generally Emily Myers, Chapter 15: Antitrust, IN STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 313–17 (Emily Myers ed., 4th ed. 2018) (discussing how 
state antitrust statutes are generally similar to the Sherman Act and construed in the same 
manner as federal antitrust laws). 
 39 Id. at 318–19. 
 40 Id. at 321. 
 41 See generally Patent Policy, USPTO, www.uspto.gov/ip-policy/patent-policy (last 
updated Nov. 1, 2019) (providing information on intellectual property policy, practice, and 
procedures). 
 42 See generally Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last updated May 
2020] New Madison Approach to Antitrust Law and IP Law 225 
at an alarming rate; however, as certain rules have been tweaked, the “death 
knell” of patents may subside.43 
The ITC can also be a forum in which to assert antitrust claims. The ITC 
investigates alleged violations of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (“Tariff 
Act”).44 These Section 337 Investigations address unfair methods of 
competition, such as the following under Section 1337(a)(1)(A): 
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
articles … into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the 
owner, importer, or consignee, the threat or effect of which is – (i) to 
destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States; (ii) to 
prevent the establishment of such an industry; or (iii) to restrain or 
monopolize trade and commerce in the United States.45 
U.S. industries can utilize the ITC to obtain relief from unfair competition 
when a product is being imported into the U.S.46 Antitrust issues may arise when 
there is a threat “to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce….”47 The ITC 
may issue an exclusion order48 to stop the importation of a product or issue a 
cease and desist order for the unfair methods or acts.49 However, any remedy is 
subject to a public interest inquiry.50 
In certain circumstances, the ITC also investigates claims of patent 
infringement for products covered by a U.S. patent or products made by a 
process covered by a U.S. patent.51 The remedies available for patent 
infringement are exclusion orders or cease and desist orders, which are available 
                                                          
9, 2017) (describing the inter partes review process); 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2011) (“[A] 
person who is not the owner of a patent” may petition for inter partes review). 
 43 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF 
STANDARD SETTING 206–07 (2d ed. 2011); Victoria Graham, Changing U.S. Patent Policy 
on Tech Standards Stirs Concerns, BNA (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.bna.com/changing-
us-patent-n57982094890/. 
 44 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2012). 
 45 Id. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 46 About Section 337, U.S. ITC, 
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/about_section_337.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 
2020). 
 47 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 48 Id. § 1337(d)(2)(A). 
 49 Id. § 1337(f). 
 50 See id. § 1337(d)(1) (“[U]nless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon 
the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the 
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers, it finds that such articles should not be excluded from entry.”); 18 U.S.C. § 
1337(f)(1) (2012) (“[U]nless after considering the effect of such order upon the public 
health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of 
like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers, it 
finds that such order should not be issued.”). 
 51 18 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
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until the patent expires.52 
B. Intellectual Property Law and Its Enforcers 
In contrast to antitrust law which can be simplistically characterized as anti-
monopolistic, intellectual property law, on the other hand, grants monopoly 
power to innovators for a limited period of time.53 The Constitution grants 
Congress the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”54 A patent holder can thus exclude others 
from practicing the invention by refusing to license the technology to others or 
by seeking an injunction.55 There is no government agency that seeks to enforce 
patents. Instead, a patent holder must police his rights and initiate private causes 
of action on his own.56 This can be a long and expensive process with no 
guaranteed remedies. Therefore, the right to exclude can be difficult to achieve,57 
especially because injunctive relief is heavily limited in the U.S. district courts 
under the eBay decision.58 
There are some critical relationships fundamental to understanding the New 
Madison Approach. An innovator exports innovation, such as patents or trade 
secrets, to others in the industry.59 An implementer is a firm that uses the 
                                                          
 52 Id. § 1337(d), (f). 
 53 Dave Resser, Differences Between Patent and Competition Laws, MOD. CASTING 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.moderncasting.com/index.php/column/2018/08/22/ 
differences-between-patent-and-competition-laws. 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2011) (showing the 
codification of patent acts). 
 55 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945) (“[A] patent owner is 
not in the position of a quasi-trustee for the public or under any obligation to see that the 
public acquires the free right to use the invention. He has no obligation either to use it or to 
grant its use to others.”), clarified, 324 U.S. 570, 572 (1945) (paying of royalties on a 
quantum meruit basis). 
 56 Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining 
that a patent holder polices the market held by the patent). 
 57 David J. Teece, Pivoting Toward Schumpeter: Makan Delrahim and the Recasting of 
U.S. Antitrust Towards Innovation, Competitiveness, and Growth, ANTITRUST, Summer 
2018, at 32, 37–38. 
 58 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also Christopher B. 
Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1985–1990 (2016) (analyzing how injunction grant rates differ by 
technology, district, type of entity—either “Patent Assertion Entities” or “All Other 
Patentees”—and type of litigant—competitors or not competitors). 
 59 Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” 
Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1383, 1383 
(2017). 
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innovator’s patents or trade secrets to manufacture or sell products.60 However, 
there is no obligation for the innovator to license patented technology to the 
implementer because the innovator holds the right to exclude and there is no 
duty to aid a competitor.61 At times, a party can be both an innovator and an 
implementer.62 Innovators and implementers can collaborate and form a patent 
pool as an economical way to develop the technology.63 
C. Standard Essential Patents 
Patents that are included in a standard are called “standard essential 
patents.”64 SSOs provide a forum for the development of a standard by various 
groups, with each group influencing the standard’s development according to 
the group’s perspective with respect to its patented technology.65 Some SSOs 
impose obligations to license in exchange for the adoption of the technology as 
part of the standard.66 Upon development of the standard, implementers can then 
use the standard according to the requirements specified without expending the 
costs that the developers of the standard incurred.67 While the standard-setting 
process has many advantages, it is a time and money intensive process to 
develop a standard.68 
Patent pools are created when patent holders add their patented technology to 
a “patent pool” in exchange for benefits, such as royalties.69 Patent pools can 
also hold standard essential patents (“SEPs”) that implementers of the 
technology must join or independently license from the patent holder in order to 
                                                          
 60 Id. 
 61 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 
(2004) (commenting that antitrust is not an exception to the principle that there is no duty to 
aid competitors). 
 62 Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 59, at 1383. 
 63 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 
35, at 30 (describing pooling arrangements as agreements between two or more owners of 
patents to license patented technology with benefits such as reduced transaction costs and 
avoidance of infringement litigation). 
 64 Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Standard-Essential Patent Licensing on “Fair, 
Reasonable, and Nondiscriminatory” (FRAND) Terms, 16 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 5, § 2 
(2016). 
 65 Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Ignorance over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding 
Standard Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 159, 166 (2018). 
 66 See HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 
18. 
 67 Osenga, supra note 65, at 167, 171 (noting that “free-riding” is also a disadvantage of 
the standard setting process). 
 68 Id. at 170–71. 
 69 Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
421, 424, 451 (2014). 
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use the technology related to the SEP.70 
Patent pools can raise anticompetitive concerns because of the risk of 
collusion to exclude products or firms in favor of SEPs.71 An SSO is a patent 
pool composed of a group of competitors who have agreed on a technology to 
the exclusion of alternatives.72 By joining forces, the competitors can hold 
substantial market power depending on the importance of the technology at 
hand.73 As the group of competitors grows more successful and innovation 
progresses, they can demand higher royalties, and become more dominant SSO 
entities.74 Market power alone is not a violation of antitrust laws, but if 
accompanied by anticompetitive conduct, a violation can be found.75 Having a 
group of competitors openly discussing technology is a situation ripe for 
collusion; selecting FRAND terms for licensing a particular standardized 
product can equate to fixing prices and limiting the availability of substitutes.76 
Standards created by the government, industry collaboration, or by market 
selection raise antitrust concerns when they restrain trade or become so accepted 
that they are the dominant standard.77 Patent holders in a standard have more 
bargaining power when they license, which can result in “patent hold-up” 
because those who have adopted a standard must license the intellectual property 
of the standard as opposed to other intellectual property.78 As a result, patent 
hold-up can force implementers that use the standard to pay high licensing fees 
                                                          
 70 Id. at 448, 454 (explaining standards-based patent pools with allocation of royalties 
among participants). 
 71 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 2 
(citing Peter Grindley et al., Standards Wars: The Use of Standard Setting as a Means of 
Facilitating Cartels: Third Generation Wireless Telecommunication Standard Setting, 3 
INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 32 (1999)) (explaining that a group of competitors can have an 
anticompetitive effect). 
 72 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 19. 
 73 Peter J. Levitas et al., Do New DOJ Leadership Statements on SEPs Signal a Change 
in Direction for Antitrust Enforcement Policy?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J., Mar. 2018, at 3, 
3. 
 74 Steven Pepe et al., INSIGHT: Licensing Strategies for SEP Licensors in the Internet 
of Things Age, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Dec. 13, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-
and-telecom-law/insight-licensing-strategies-for-sep-licensors-in-the-internet-of-things-age 
(discussing the progression of 2G to 5G standards and the importance of licensing). 
 75 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 
35, at 4. 
 76 Id. at 8. 
 77 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 3; 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (citing Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (“antitrust laws, however, were enacted for 
‘the protection of competition not competitors.’ “). 
 78 See Andy Updegrove, FTC Seeks Input on Patent Holdup in Standards Development, 
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (May 16, 2011), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/ 
articles/ftc-seeks-input-patent-holdup-standards-development. 
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due to the high demands of the innovator.79 Royalty stacking can occur when 
manufacturing requires the “stacking” of multiple standards to create the final 
product.80 
However, the procompetitive effects of standards are recognized and can 
outweigh any anticompetitive effects.81 For example, users can focus 
development on the adopted standard rather than wasting resources on potential 
technologies; additionally, costs are shared for research and development.82 
Licensing through a SSO has procompetitive benefits of saving on the costs of 
contracting and selling intellectual property rights, which increases the value of 
the intellectual property to provide further incentives to innovate.83 
Complementary factors of manufacturing and distributing a product, and of 
providing and maintaining effective workforces can be leveraged through the 
use of standardized technology to provide procompetitive benefit.84 
After briefly discussing antitrust and intellectual property law, an analysis of 
the New Madison Approach also requires understanding the evolution of patent 
hold-up and patent hold-out in intellectual property law.85 
D. Patent Hold-up 
An image of a bank robbery can help visualize what happens in patent hold-
up: an SSO has a standard which requires the use of certain patents in order to 
practice the standard, but a patent holder refuses to license or extracts such high 
royalty fees that licensing is essentially impossible unless the high fees are 
paid.86 In other words, the innovator extracts excessive royalties from 
implementers after the implementers have committed to the standard.87 The 
would-be licensee is locked-in to the standard unless there is another way to 
practice the standard, but that may require using inferior technology at an 
extreme cost.88 
                                                          
 79 Osenga, supra note 65, at 172. 
 80 Id.; FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86219, 
at *88 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019) (describing testimony by LGE that aggregate royalties 
could reach 25% of the cell phone price, making it impossible to make a profit). 
 81 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 14. 
 82 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 309 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 83 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 
35, at 5. 
 84 Id. 
 85 James J. Tierney & Emily Luken, The New Madison Approach Goes to Court, 
ORRICK ANTITRUST WATCH (Jan. 23, 2019), https://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2019/01/23/ 
the-new-madison-approach-goes-to-court/ (discussing patent hold-up and hold-out in the 
first two premises of the New Madison Approach). 
 86 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 19. 
 87 Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 59, at 1384. 
 88 Osenga, supra note 65, at 174. 
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Antitrust concerns are raised in patent hold-up when there is deceptive 
conduct during standard development.89 A patent holder can falsely represent 
the scope of his patent protection or commit to licensing on fair and reasonable 
terms, knowing that he would not agree to license on the negotiated terms.90 
In the Matter of Rambus, Inc., the FTC found that Rambus purposefully failed 
to disclose its patents and misled standard developers.91 Rambus did not disclose 
plans to amend standard-related patent applications while at the same time 
participating in the standard-setting process.92 Upon adoption of the standard by 
the SSO, Rambus revealed its patents and sued for patent infringement.93 The 
FTC found that the SSO operated in good faith; members were required to 
disclose their patents, patent applications and agree to licensing on reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms in an effort to prevent patent holdup.94 The FTC 
found Rambus’s concealment was exclusionary conduct that contributed to its 
acquisition of monopoly power, and that there was a causal link between the 
exclusionary conduct and the standards adopted by the SSO.95 
At the same time as the Rambus proceeding, Broadcom v. Qualcomm was 
decided.96 The third circuit held that anticompetitive conduct can be found in a 
consensus-oriented private SSO when the SSO relies on an initial false promise 
to license on FRAND terms and that promise is breached.97 Referencing the FTC 
Rambus decision, the court reasoned that deception harms competition.98 
Following the Broadcom decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the FTC Rambus decision.99 The FTC’s finding of monopolization was 
based on the alleged deception Rambus practiced: by its deception, Rambus 
acquired monopoly power or avoided paying licensing fees that the SSO would 
have otherwise required.100 The court questioned whether there was sufficient 
evidence to find deceitful behavior, and additionally reasoned that 
monopolization cannot be predicated on an entity charging higher prices by 
practicing deceitful behavior.101 In order to be violative, the monopoly power 
                                                          
 89 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 
117. 
 90 Id. at 118. 
 91 Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 FTC LEXIS 60, at *4 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006). 
 92 Id. at *4–5. 
 93 Id.; see Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 94 Rambus, Inc., 2006 FTC LEXIS 60, at *4. 
 95 Id. at *5. 
 96 Broadcomm Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 97 Id. at 314. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 100 Id. at 461. 
 101 Id. at 464. 
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must be coupled with exclusionary acts that harm the consumer or reduce the 
social welfare. Harm to one or two competitors is not sufficient.102 The court 
reasoned that the FTC failed to show the standard would not have been adopted 
if Rambus had disclosed its patents (i.e., if Rambus had not been deceitful); 
therefore, the SSO simply lost a licensing opportunity, which is not an antitrust 
harm.103 In other words, there must be a causal link between the acts of deception 
and the adopted standard; the link cannot simply be a result of higher prices.104 
Another antitrust concern is when the patent holder later refuses to license on 
the agreed upon reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.105 However, proving 
that a breach of a promise has an anticompetitive effect may be difficult, and 
another remedy is to bring suit for breach of contract.106 The terms of the 
FRAND commitment need to be analyzed closely, as field-of-use restrictions 
and component level restrictions can limit the duty of licensing under a FRAND 
commitment.107 
Former acting assistant attorney general for the antitrust division at the DOJ, 
Renata Hesse, has offered six proposals for SSOs to consider in order to promote 
competition.108 These proposals were important because they recognized that 
SSOs are diverse in structure and technology, and there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach; nevertheless, clarification was needed to enhance the chances of 
success and prevent the problem of hold-up.109 Furthermore, Hesse advocated 
that the DOJ can look for competitive harm when standard essential patent 
holders do not abide by FRAND commitments.110 
                                                          
 102 Id. at 463 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 
2001)). 
 103 Id. at 466–67. 
 104 HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING, supra note 43, at 
122. 
 105 Id. at 118. 
 106 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2015) (alleging 
breach of contract when Motorola failed to license on RAND terms its standard essential 
patents). 
 107 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 
35, at 1, 5. 
 108 Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust 
Div., Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch, Remarks at the ITU-T Patent 
Roundtable (Oct. 10, 2012) (suggesting SSOs clarify FRAND commitments, make FRAND 
encumbrances convey to subsequent owners, permit cash-only licensing option, limit 
injunctions, create guidelines or arbitration provisions to determine FRAND rates, and 
determine which patents are truly essential to the standard). 
 109 Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust 
Div., IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last Four Years (Feb. 8, 2013). 
 110 Osenga, supra note 65, at 210. 
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E. Patent Hold-out 
Patent hold-out results when a would-be licensee fails to take a license, and 
waits for the licensor to sue the licensee for either damages or an injunction to 
stop using the technology.111 In other words, the implementer refuses to license 
in good faith, and the innovator must resort to litigation to obtain damages.112 
The implementer holds out because the time and expense of litigation can drive 
the innovator to just plainly give-up or even go insolvent.113 
Commentators have emphasized that when SSO members negotiate standards 
and licenses, both innovators and implementers come to the table willingly and 
voluntarily.114 Innovators give up their right to exclude for their patented 
technology and give away confidential information by joining the SSO.115 In 
return, both sides strive to achieve fair royalty rates and reduce transaction costs, 
even though they may not know the value of each patent as the standard and 
technology progress.116 Commentators argue that when there is a failure to 
bargain in good faith, a variety of remedies should be available, including 
damages, injunctions, or a combination of both.117 If there is a threat of various 
harms, all parties have an incentive to abide by the promises made.118 
However, the availability of injunctive relief is not universally accepted and 
sometimes even ignored by the courts.119 The governing case for injunctive relief 
is eBay v. MercExchange, which has made it difficult for an owner of a SEP to 
obtain injunctive relief in district court.120 In Apple v. Motorola, Judge Sharon 
Post argued that while injunctions should not be categorically denied, an 
injunction is not always appropriate because an alleged infringer has the right to 
challenge a FRAND-committed patent before agreeing to pay royalties, or to 
receive extra royalties for infringement when there has been bad faith 
negotiations.121 Dissenting-in-part, Chief Judge Randall Rader argued that 
                                                          
 111 Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 59, at 1384 (explaining that patent holdout can also be 
thought of as “efficient infringement” or “efficient breach”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1407. 
 114 Id. at 1393. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Mrinalini Kochupillai & Matthew A. Smith, Patent Valuation with Consideration for 
Emerging Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 154, 154 (2007) (describing considerations 
for valuating patents). 
 117 Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 59, at 1403–04. 
 118 Id. at 1404. 
 119 Id. at 1413. 
 120 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see Christopher B. 
Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1950–51 (2016). 
 121 Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Prost, J., 
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Motorola should have been given the opportunity to show that Apple refused to 
license or even negotiate, and that by practicing hold-out, an injunctive remedy 
was appropriate.122 In addition, it is difficult and costly for innovators to assert 
patent rights when courts require asserting patents individually, but FRAND 
commitments are based on portfolios rather than individual standard essential 
patents.123 
In a recent case, Huawei claims that Samsung practiced patent hold-out by 
refusing to license. Samsung claims Huawei had consistently exhibited 
deceptive behavior in refusing to license on FRAND terms, amounting to 
antitrust violations.124 Ultimately, in response to a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court found that Samsung provided insufficient evidence 
of a complete refusal to deal by Huawei.125 
Antitrust violations are sought because of the ability to receive trebled 
damages, but the antitrust laws also provide for injunctive relief.126 Past views 
by the DOJ have supported proposed policy changes of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated (“IEEE”) Patent Policy to not pursue 
injunctive relief.127 The DOJ issued a business review letter stating that IEEE’s 
updated policy clarified the FRAND terms, and could also help the problem of 
patent hold-up.128 A limitation on injunctive relief was also supported.129 
                                                          
concurring) (writing separately against the majority view that unilateral refusal to license 
gives rise to injunctive relief). 
 122 Id. at 1334 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 123 Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain Old 
Patent Infringement, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Feb. 2016, at 1, 2. 
 124 Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 172103, at *953 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018). 
 125 Id. (describing Huawei’s negotiation at the same rate and pursuit of injunctive relief 
in China as insufficient evidence of maintaining monopoly power through exclusionary 
conduct). 
 126 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012) (restitution and disgorgement are also available); id. § 54(a) 
(stating that the DOJ may bring criminal sanctions); see id. § 1. 
 127 Levitas et al., supra note 73, at 3. 
 128 Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney L.L.P., and Inst. of 
Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2015). 
 129 Id. at 10 (“The Update’s express limitation on the availability of exclusionary relief 
may reduce any remaining uncertainty among implementers of IEEE-SA standards by 
limiting the ability of patent holders who have made an IEEE RAND Commitment to seek 
prohibitive orders that would prevent those willing to license from making, using, or selling 
products that comply with the standard. This provision may place additional limits on patent 
holders’ ability to obtain injunctive relief in a U.S. court, but it appears that, in practice, it 
will not be significantly more restrictive than current U.S. case law, and the added clarity 
may help parties reach agreement more quickly.”). 
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II. A SHIFT IN POLICY BY DELRAHIM 
As the discussion of patent hold-up and hold-out above shows, intellectual 
property law and antitrust law have overlapping spheres of influence. David 
Teece advocated at a 1988 conference that antitrust laws should promote 
dynamic competition resulting from new products and new processes.130 In a 
long-term competitive analysis with respect to intellectual property, products 
may be more expensive today due to innovators collecting royalties; however in 
the long-term, royalties enable companies to research, develop, and drive 
innovation to new levels, thereby enhancing consumer welfare.131 After a history 
of short-term planning for the field, the advocacy of Assistant Attorney General 
Makan Delrahim is a shift in thinking.132 
A. The New Madison Approach 
Makan Delrahim gave a series of speeches to advocate for the New Madison 
Approach.133 There are four elements to this approach: 1) patent hold-up is not 
an antitrust problem; 2) standard-setting organizations should better protect 
against hold-out to ensure maximum incentives to innovate; 3) patent holder 
rights should be protected, not persecuted; and 4) a unilateral and unconditional 
refusal to license a valid patent should be per se legal.134 
As to the first element, Delrahim argues that patent hold-up is fundamentally 
not an antitrust problem.135 Antitrust law is directed to ensure consumer welfare 
and look for anticompetitive behavior that harms consumers.136 Delrahim’s view 
is that antitrust law should not be used to police FRAND commitments because 
they can be enforced by breach of contract claims.137 Delrahim also argues that 
patent hold-up is “an enigma in the academic literature.”138 
Expounding on the first element in a later speech, Delrahim argued that 
                                                          
 130 Teece, supra note 57, at 32. 
 131 Id. (providing examples of short-term analysis from FTC decisions breaking up 
AT&T/Bell labs and losing great research history and of NXP resulting in exporting 
technology to China). 
 132 C. Fairley Spillman, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Signals Shift in 
Antitrust/IP Focus, HIGHBEAM (Dec. 5, 2017), www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
517505269.html. 
 133 See Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property 
Law, supra note 2. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Allen Foer & Durst, supra note 18, at 502. 
 137 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2. 
 138 Id. 
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act is “agnostic to the price that a patent-holder seeks 
to charge” in FRAND commitments.139 Good faith and fair dealing is applicable 
to contract law, but antitrust law does not turn on fair prices.140 Further, as to 
commitments to charge non-discriminatory rates, Delrahim urges that the 
Sherman Act is indifferent to price discrimination and can even find price 
discrimination pro-competitive.141 Lastly, citing Trinko, Delrahim reiterates that 
courts are ill-suited for determining a reasonable licensing rate.142 Thus, while 
there may be contractual duties under FRAND commitments, antitrust laws are 
not necessarily implicated because FRAND commitments can be pro-
competitive.143 
For his second element, Delrahim advocates that SSOs should protect against 
hold-out.144 Implementers stand in a special position because they can wait to 
invest time and resources into a specific standard until after the innovators have 
already done all the work to develop the standard.145 Therefore, implementers 
can threaten innovation, and a consensus approach recognizing the role of both 
innovators and implementers in choosing the standards and royalties should be 
used.146 Recognizing hold-out as a possibility, SSOs should work to thwart their 
occurrence. 
The third element states that the patent holder’s right to an injunction should 
be protected.147 Injunctions should be recognized and available as part of a 
patent owner’s right to exclude others from using his invention; if not, SSOs can 
become de facto compulsory licensing schemes, which can discourage 
                                                          
 139 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, Remarks at IAM’s Patent 
Licensing Conference in San Francisco (Sept. 18, 2018). 
 140 Id. (“Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, 
without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a 
federal law of unfair competition or ‘purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by 
and against persons engaged in interstate commerce.’ “ (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 
U.S. 821, 826 (1945))). 
 141 Id. (referring to James C. Cooper et al., Does Price Discrimination Intensify 
Competition? Implications for Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 327, 369 (2005)). 
 142 Id. (describing antitrust law as failing to recognize a cause of action in which 
“antitrust courts [need] to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and 
other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill-suited.” (quoting Verizon Commc’ns 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004))). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. (referring to James C. Cooper et al., Does Price Discrimination Intensify 
Competition? Implications for Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 327, 369 (2005)). 
 145 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id.; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (articulating the 
test for injunctions as irreparable injury, inadequate remedies, remedy is warranted, and 
public interest). 
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innovators from joining.148 Delrahim has announced that the DOJ has withdrawn 
from a 2013 USPTO-DOJ Joint Policy Statement about remedies for standard-
essential patents with FRAND commitments.149 The Antitrust Division believes 
that the 2013 Joint Policy Statement can be confusing because it suggests that 
an injunction or exclusion order can harm competition and consumers.150 In 
withdrawing from the 2013 Joint Policy Statement, Delrahim reiterates that 
patent hold-up and hold-out can both occur, and SSOs can stray away from 
procompetitive behavior.151 
The final element is that the unilateral refusal to license a patent should be per 
se legal.152 A patent owner need not be forced to aid his competitor, and refusal 
to license should not be the basis for finding anticompetitive harm.153 
In other remarks about the New Madison Approach, Delrahim cautions 
against false positives or condemning lawful procompetitive conduct.154 
Delrahim argues that FRAND contract terms can be vague and antitrust actions 
seeking treble damages can chill innovation.155 While false negatives or 
underenforcement under Section 2 of the Sherman Act may exist, Delrahim 
argues they should be rare.156 
The New Madison Approach seeks to spur innovation by strengthening the 
patent system, while also respecting antitrust law and its role in policing 
anticompetitive behavior. Delrahim announced the New Madison Approach 
                                                          
 148 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2. 
 149 Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
“Telegraph Road”*: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust 
Law, Remarks Before the 19th Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute 
(Dec. 7, 2018); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY 
F/RAND COMMITMENTS 1, 9–10 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1118381/ 
download. 
 150 Delrahim, “Telegraph Road”*: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent 
and Antitrust Law, supra note 149. 
 151 Id. (describing how the Supreme Court has recognized the opportunity for 
anticompetitive activity in SSOs). 
 152 Delrahim, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 
supra note 2. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Delrahim, Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, supra note 139. 
 155 Id.; see also Edward Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages in Monopolization 
Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 97, 115 (2009) (“Treble damages encourage questionable Section 
2 suits, magnify the cost of error, chill procompetitive behavior, and may stifle 
innovation.”). 
 156 Delrahim, Antitrust Law and Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, supra note 139 
(“Though such a situation may occur on rare occasions, I remain skeptical that it does so 
with regularity, given that the principal goal of standard setting is to select the superior 
technology among competing alternatives.”). 
2020] New Madison Approach to Antitrust Law and IP Law 237 
through a series of speeches, and has received responses both in favor and 
against it.157 
B. Support for New Madison Approach 
In a letter addressed to Delrahim (“DOJ Support Letter”), a group of experts 
in antitrust law and intellectual property law supported the New Madison 
Approach and welcomed applying antitrust law equally to both innovators and 
implementers.158 They reiterated that there is no hold-up problem.159 They 
emphasized that injunctive relief has not been shown to produce consumer 
harm.160 As evidence of the problem of past policy, they noted a change in 
practice from licensing at the end-user device level which enabled optimizing 
the complete system and network, to licensing according to particular 
components in a smartphone.161 
David Kappos argues that hold-up is just a pretext for attacking intellectual 
property rights.162 As examples, he points to the FTC having initiated 
proceedings for antitrust violations based simply on threatening or seeking an 
injunction or ITC exclusion order.163 Furthermore, he notes that DOJ Assistant 
Attorney General Hesse contemplated that simply seeking an injunction by a 
SEP owner that violates FRAND royalty terms can be an antitrust violation.164 
Ken Stanwood, an inventor, shares how a startup firm he worked for was 
willing to participate in standards development in part because injunctions were 
                                                          
 157 Tierney & Luken, supra note 85 (noting that while the approach has thus far only 
been advocated through speeches, the Antitrust Division may look to present its views in 
court or attempt to participate in FRAND cases). 
 158 Letter from Jonathan Barnett et al., to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Antitrust Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 13, 2018), https://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/31/2018/02/Letter-to-DOJ-Supporting-Evidence-Based-Approach-to-
Antitrust-Enforcement-of-IP.pdf. 
 159 Id. (citing articles by Epstein, Layne-Farrar, Feletovic, Ginsburg, Llobet, Mallinson, 
Padilla, Putnam, Sidak, Tsai and Wright). 
 160 Id. (“[N]o empirical study has demonstrated that a patent-owner’s request for 
injunctive relief after a finding of a defendant’s infringement of its property rights has ever 
resulted either in consumer harm or in slowing down the pace of technological 
innovation.”). 
 161 Id. 
 162 David J. Kappos, The Antitrust Assault on Intellectual Property, 31 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 665, 676 (2018). 
 163 Id. at 676 (citing Complaint 19–20, 23, In re Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC Docket No. 
C-4377 (2012); Complaint at 19, 25–27, In re Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC 
Docket No. C-4410 (2013)). 
 164 Id. at 676–77. 
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available.165 Injunctions were part of “a working patent system.”166 Now, he 
believes a startup firm may be more likely to hold inventions as trade secrets due 
to efficient infringement by larger, multinational corporations.167 
An alliance of companies wrote a letter to Department of Commerce 
Secretary Wilbur Ross and USPTO Director Andrei Iancu in support of the New 
Madison Approach and the DOJ withdrawal from the 2013 Joint Policy 
Statement with the USPTO.168 The companies reiterate that as licensors and 
licensees in technology such as 5G technology, they rely on the FRAND 
licensing framework to help recoup the costs of research and development.169 
The companies believe that the 2013 Joint Policy Statement “encouraged and 
emboldened strategic long-term infringement” and the problem of patent hold-
out worsened.170 
Senator Thom Tillis and Senator Chris Coons, who lead the intellectual 
property committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote a letter applauding 
the decision to withdraw from the 2013 Joint Policy Statement.171 They stated 
that the 2013 Joint Policy Statement “created unnecessary confusion, 
emboldened strategic infringers, and had the potential to discourage investment 
by American companies, innovators, and entrepreneurs in critical 
technologies.”172 They encouraged Delrahim to work with the USPTO on a 
revised policy statement about licensing and enforcement of standard essential 
patents and patents with FRAND commitments.173 
C. Disagreement with the New Madison Approach 
Steve Sunshine has suggested that the New Madison Approach is “in sharp 
                                                          
 165 Ken Stanwood, SEPs Need Injunctions Too, LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1121992/print?section=ip. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Letter from Ericsson, Nokia, Philips, and Qualcomm, to Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of 
Commerce, and Andrei Iancu, Dir. of U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Mar. 18, 2019), 
https://innovationalliance.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Ericsson-Nokia-Philips-
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the support by Ericsson, Nokia, Philips and Qualcomm of the New Madison Approach). 
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 171 Letter from U.S. Senate, Comm. on the Judiciary, to William Pelham Barr, U.S. 
Attorney Gen., and Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. of U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice (Oct. 21, 2019). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id.; see Tiffany Hu, Sens. Tell DOJ to Fix ‘Growing Divide’ with USPTO Over SEPs, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1212528/sens-tell-doj-to-fix-
growing-divide-with-uspto-over-seps. 
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contrast” to previous administrations and “perhaps most of the mainstream 
bar.”174 In a letter (“FTC Letter”) expressing her own views, then FTC 
Commissioner Terrell McSweeny maintains that patent holdup is a problem.175 
She argues patent hold-up can be anticompetitive, which has been extensively 
studied, and highlights a review (“2007 Report”) of the problem.176 The 2007 
Report showed consumer harm in higher prices and decreased investment in the 
development and implementation of standards.177 An additional report also 
found that “hold-up in the standard setting context can be particularly acute.”178 
McSweeny argues that patent hold-up is “merely ‘a variant of the classic hold-
up problem.’ “179 
As evidence of patent holdup, McSweeny observes that courts have found that 
the FRAND royalties were 1/150th or 1/500th of a reasonable rate as calculated 
by a neutral arbitrator.180 McSweeny urges that, consistent with past practice, a 
case-by-case approach should be used to determine whether patent hold-up 
violates antitrust law.181 
Another commentator believes that the FTC antitrust action against 
Qualcomm, when considered in light of the New Madison Approach, “suggests 
divergence” between the FTC and the DOJ.182 FTC Commissioner Kelly 
Slaughter has a “strongly different view”183 than that of the DOJ under the New 
Madison Approach. 
Prior to the New Madison Approach, several cases supported the views 
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 183 Alexei Alexis & Victoria Graham, FTC’s Slaughter Opposes DOJ’s Policy on 
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eventually adopted in the 2013 Joint Policy Statement.184 In general, the prior 
administration believed that money damages, as opposed to injunctions, were a 
more appropriate remedy of a standard-essentials patent subject to a FRAND 
commitment.185 However, the 2013 Joint Policy Statement did also recognize 
that exclusion orders can be appropriate; for example, where a putative licensee 
refuses to pay or even negotiate to determine FRAND terms.186 
Another commentator believes that withdrawing from the 2013 Joint Policy 
Statement is “a step backwards” and that courts should continue, rather than 
change policy approaches, to police FRAND agreements for fair pricing when 
the parties cannot come to an agreement.187 Rather than promoting innovation, 
others believe that the New Madison Approach increases the risk of litigation to 
manufacturers that made products subject to SSO patents and decreases 
incentives to innovate.188 Another believes the New Madison Approach 
“represents a threat to U.S. competitiveness in standardized technologies” and 
uncertainty is a disincentive to invest in SSO technology.189 One critique is that 
withdrawing from the 2013 Joint Policy Statement threatens pro-competitive 
collaboration because collaboration will become more unpredictable.190 
FTC Chairman Joseph Simons gave a speech in which he included remarks 
about intellectual property, which both supports and opposes the New Madison 
Approach.191 He voiced agreement with the DOJ Antitrust Division’s position 
that a Sherman Act violation requires not only a breach of a FRAND 
commitment, but that the breach contributes to acquiring or maintaining 
monopoly power or unreasonably restrains trade.192 Simons noted that patent 
hold-up can be an antitrust violation, but also that patent hold-out with collusion 
among potential adopters or licensees can also result in antitrust violations.193 
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Simons reiterated that the FTC uses an “economically ground[ed] and fact-based 
enforcement” of antitrust law.194 
D. Approach to Similar Issues in Other Jurisdictions 
Given the wide reach of multinational firms and intellectual property 
available around the world, it is useful to understand how other countries handle 
the issues of patent holdup and patent hold-out, the use of injunctions, and the 
unilateral refusal to license. Companies would like to have predictable 
competition enforcement around the world, and just as in intellectual property, 
harmonization of efforts would be desirable.195 
In Europe, the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union has 
competition rules in Articles 101 and 102.196 Similar to Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, Article 102 sanctions the abuse of dominant position.197 In a case before the 
European Court of Justice, dominance was defined as “a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition” in a relevant market by power independent of its competitors, 
customers and consumers.198 In another case, abuse is defined as behavior that 
“influence[s] the structure of a market,” weakening the degree of competition 
by its undertaking and by its effect, “hindering the maintenance of the degree of 
competition still existing in the market.”199 
The rules on competition apply to standard-setting activities, and 
standardization is encouraged because of the efficiencies it creates.200 The EU 
has issued horizontal agreement guidelines discussing how a standardization 
agreement that affects a parties’ ability to develop alternative standards or to 
commercialize products according to a different standard may infringe Article 
101.201 However, when SSOs adopt standards on nondiscriminatory, open and 
transparent procedures, they are not likely to infringe Article 101 because parties 
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may choose to use different standards or form products based on different 
standards.202 These guidelines also state that “agreements that promote 
economic interpenetration in the common market or encourage the development 
of new markets and improved supply conditions” are looked upon favorably.203 
In addition, when standards have restrictions, they must be “no more than what 
is necessary to ensure their aims, whether this is technical compatibility or a 
certain level of quality.”204 Generally, all may participate in standard setting; 
however, membership may be restricted if otherwise inefficiencies develop.205 
Industry standards must license proprietary information on FRAND terms.206 In 
draft guidelines, it is encouraged that “[t]he IPR [intellectual property rights] 
policy [of the SSOs] should also require that all holders of essential IPR in 
technology which may be adopted as part of a standard provide an irrevocable 
commitment in writing to license their IPR to all third parties on fair, reasonable, 
and nondiscriminatory terms.”207 To discourage holdup, the draft guidelines also 
state that “the IPR policy should require good faith disclosure of those 
intellectual property rights … that might be essential for the implementation of 
a standard under development before that standard is agreed.”208 
In the European equivalent to the American case of Rambus, Rambus was 
also accused of failing to disclose its intellectual property during the 
development of standards in Europe; Rambus then asserted their rights when the 
standards were adopted, resulting in an abuse of a dominant position because of 
excessive pricing.209 Rambus eventually agreed to charge a reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory royalty rate.210 
The difficulty of enforcing the prohibition on excessive prices under Article 
102 is recognized.211 Determining what is an excessive price can be difficult and 
involves comparing the price to competing products.212 In United Brands, an 
excessive price was defined as one that “has no reasonable relation to the 
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economic value of the product supplied.”213 Commentators have argued that 
excessive prices are anticompetitive only in exceptional circumstances.214 
III. ANALYSIS 
Through a series of speeches, the DOJ has shifted policy in the enforcement 
of antitrust law in the field of intellectual property. This is perhaps a natural 
result of recent history. For perspective, a merging of events occurred in the U.S. 
patent system: the passage of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), significant court 
decisions, and the rise of patent trolls; these events created uncertainty in the 
strength of patent rights.215 
The AIA was passed in 2011 changing the U.S. from a first-to-invent system 
to a first-inventor-to-file system.216 The AIA also established inter partes 
review, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) became the “death 
squad” of patent holders as third parties successfully challenged patents.217 The 
2013 Joint Policy Statement included statements that questioned the availability 
of injunctions.218 
Patent trolls were perceived to be abusing the patent system because Patent 
Assertion Entities (“PAEs”) used aggressive litigation to sue companies with 
dubious claims of patent infringement.219 The Obama White House published a 
report describing that PAEs had threatened over 100,000 companies in 2012, 
and the number of suits has tripled in the previous two years.220 
The 2006 eBay decision made it more difficult to obtain an injunction.221 
Rather than having injunctions as a default remedy, under eBay, companies had 
to show, among other factors, that they suffered irreparable injury.222 While it is 
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argued that injunctions have decreased in part because of more savvy defenses, 
at least from 2017 to 2018, the number of permanent and preliminary injunctions 
has nonetheless decreased.223 Under subsequent court decisions, Alice and its 
progeny, patents were increasingly found invalid as lacking utility.224 
Against this backdrop, the administration and leadership at the DOJ changed. 
Makan Delrahim, through the New Madison Approach announced a shift in 
policy.225 The director of the USPTO argued that inventors should be 
encouraged to take risks and innovate, and that “in our zeal to eliminate ‘trolls’ 
… we have over-corrected and risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”226 
He called for narrowly tailored measures to find where faults exist, and “to seek 
balance, consistency, predictability, and reliability in our IP systems.”227 The 
USPTO announced shifts in policy in IPR proceedings and an effort to clarify 
office claim rejections in light of Alice.228 
The New Madison Approach is the executive branch’s pushback to an erosion 
of patent rights. The New Madison Approach forces the issue of whether or not 
patent hold-up is a problem.229 Those who say it is a problem point to unfair 
terms or deceit practiced by those who hold intellectual property rights. Those 
who say patent hold-up is not a problem highlight the importance of intellectual 
property in driving the economy; by being short-sighted to save a dollar today, 
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the economy foregoes unknown advances in technology that the act of providing 
and developing standards can provide. 
The antitrust question is whether there has been more consumer harm than 
benefit when a monopolist practices patent hold-up. Patents grant an exclusive 
right; a monopolist can refuse to deal, practice price discrimination, or have 
exclusionary practices.230 A rule of reason analysis is used to determine whether 
there has been a violation of antitrust law. 
On the other hand, patents grant a time limited right to exclude, and flexibility 
is demanded because the intellectual property system provides incentives to 
further innovate.231 What may be perceived as exorbitant royalty rates can enable 
the company to conduct further research and promote the progress of science. 
The incentive to make money attracts those willing to invest time and energy 
into developing new ideas. The intellectual property system enables startup 
companies to take an idea, patent it, and earn licensing revenues, which can be 
reinvested in the company for more research and development.232 Small 
companies can grow to become large multinational companies because the 
original owner or inventor was able to leverage their patent portfolio. What may 
appear to be consumer harm may, over time, result in consumer benefit because 
a patent holder has been able to effectively leverage patent rights. 
In addition, patent protection lasts a short time, and the time to reap the 
benefits of a patented technology will shorten as technology is replaced by newer 
and improved ideas.233 It is therefore not a simple matter to say that patent hold-
up harms the consumer when the price seems unfair on its face. The facts and 
circumstances vary by case, and each case demands a full analysis. 
As supported by Trinko, there is no duty for a patent holder to aid his 
competitor.234 A patent owner has the right to exclude others from practicing his 
invention.235 This includes the right to seek an injunction. Being widely 
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successful and achieving dominance by itself is not antitrust harm; the 
dominance must be accompanied by some exclusionary act that creates 
anticompetitive harm, and even then, it must be analyzed on a case by case basis 
in relation to the procompetitive effects of the case. 
On the other hand, the right to exclude is not unqualified. In Aspen Skiing Co. 
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., Aspen Skiing had a course of dealing with 
Aspen Highlands in offering an all-Aspen, six-day ticket.236 Aspen Skiing 
eventually withdrew participating in the all-Aspen ticket and substituted it with 
a three-area ticket that excluded Aspen Highlands.237 As a result, Aspen 
Highlands’ market share decreased by almost 50 percent and it lost revenues 
with associated skiing services.238 The court held that the right to refuse to deal 
is not unqualified.239 In the patent context, the facts and circumstances of a case 
may find that a patent holder who has a course of dealing in contracting and 
abiding by FRAND commitments, may not unilaterally withdraw from those 
commitments solely to maintain monopoly power. 
In an FTC antitrust action against Qualcomm, Judge Lucy H. Koh found 
Qualcomm had a duty to license standard essential patents to rivals.240 The 
district court relied on the ninth circuit’s discussion of Trinko and Aspen Skiing 
in MetroNet Services Corp. v. Qwest Corp.241 Agreeing with MetroNet, the 
district court discussed that in Aspen Skiing, there were three factors not present 
in Trinko: 1) terminating a course of dealing that was voluntary and profitable; 
2) refusing to deal despite receiving retail pricing, which suggested 
anticompetitive conduct; and 3) refusing to provide a competitor a product 
already sold to other customers.242 In an analogous fashion to MetroNet’s three 
factors, the court found that Qualcomm had a duty to deal because: 1) Qualcomm 
terminated a voluntary and profitable course of dealing; 2) it was motivated by 
anticompetitive malice in refusing to license; and 3) a retail market existed for 
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licensing at the modem chip level.243 
While private standard-setting organizations have the right to set up rules for 
how they conduct business, having a variety of remedies available ensures the 
best final result for all. Contractual remedies are available when there are 
FRAND disputes.244 Antitrust remedies of treble damages, injunctive relief, or 
criminal sanctions can be pursued when warranted.245 However, it is only by 
having an equilibrium in which a variety of remedies are available that the 
system can be flexible and strong enough to meet the varied issues of the day. 
Injunctive relief is a valuable remedy and limiting its availability can cause 
harm. 
The quintessential right of a patent holder is the right to exclude others from 
practicing the patented invention.246 This right should only be withdrawn under 
circumstances that warrant it. As explained above, it is not a simple matter to 
toy with the intellectual property system that has brought about great innovation 
and advances in society over hundreds of years. Incentives exist to promote the 
progress of science and using antitrust law to upset that balance should be 
reserved for unique circumstances. 
The EU has a different method of enforcement than the U.S, so it is hard to 
compare the two systems of enforcement.247 However, it is useful to know that 
FRAND is highly valued and good faith bargaining is expected in the EU. In the 
U.S., contract law expects that two willing parties, who voluntarily negotiate a 
license agreement, do so in good faith and expect fair and reasonable terms. 
Otherwise, a party can just walk away if the terms are not suitable. Both the U.S. 
and Europe struggle with the balance of intellectual property rights and 
competition policy. It may just be that there must be a struggle with a constant 
back and forth to reach an equilibrium among parties in an SSO. 
The New Madison Approach is an important shift from former views of a bias 
against injunctions, towards a viewpoint in which injunctions are a viable and 
valuable option.248 As noted by inventor Ken Stanwood, small companies should 
not be bullied around by large multinational corporations.249 Companies that 
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enter into contracts with FRAND agreements need to make sure that those 
contracts have clear FRAND terms so that they can be enforced if necessary 
under contract law. 
The FTC and the DOJ are at a crossroads. The DOJ has started the debate 
related to patent hold-up, hold-out, injunctions, and the per se right to exclude 
others from practicing one’s invention.250 It is time for the two agencies to meet 
and come to an agreement. The New Madison Approach is a necessary step. 
Users of both antitrust law and patent law need clarity. They need guidelines, 
clear policy statements, and regulations that instill the ideas of the New Madison 
Approach. 
If the FTC and DOJ persist in different views, there can be unintended 
consequences. For example, while still under appeal, the FTC has prevailed in 
an antitrust action against Qualcomm because of its “no license-no chips” 
policy.251 On the other hand, Apple and Qualcomm have come to a settlement 
to drop all litigation worldwide.252 These issues have important ramifications. If 
a company cannot rely on the patent system to protect innovation, then 
innovation and the American public will be harmed. Inventors may resort to 
trade secrets, which does not benefit the progress of science that results from the 
continual push and pull of innovators improving upon known technology. 
The FTC has recently conducted extensive hearings to determine whether the 
“economy, evolving business practices, new technologies, or international 
developments might require adjustments to competition and consumer 
protection law, enforcement priorities, and policy.”253 The FTC and DOJ do not 
act in a vacuum, but are influenced by their interactions, their choice of 
cooperation in which enforcement to pursue or not to pursue, and consistency 
with administration goals.254 As an independent agency, the FTC’s views are 
important to ensure a balanced approach to antitrust law and intellectual property 
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law and to help moderate views held by the DOJ.255 
The debate centered around the New Madison Approach deserves further 
consideration. The availability of contract law as a remedy should be tested. Are 
the contracts at issue in standard-setting organizations clear and enforceable? 
One commentator has noted that, as of May 2018, no state or federal court has 
found a RAND contract unenforceable.256 However, in an investigation at the 
ITC a contract was found to not be reasonably certain, and therefore 
unenforceable under New York law.257 The availability of promissory estoppel 
and equitable estoppel in the patent context can be considered.258 
Past use of contract law can be studied more in depth, including empirical 
studies. The judicial system is overburdened, juries are unpredictable, and cases 
often settle. For those reasons, parties may be reluctant to put all the particulars 
of a contract on the public record when they seek to enforce an agreement. 
The intersection of common law and public enforcement can be more deeply 
tested. If contract law is available, the circumstances under which antitrust law 
is available, precluded, needed, or the better solution can be delineated. 
A comparison of the New Madison Approach for standard-essential patents 
compared to patents generally can be used to further test the approach and gain 
a deeper understanding of the issues involved. While patents are territorial, 
technology is developed in the global marketplace and companies negotiate 
global royalty rates; this raises more issues for consideration.259 
Thus far, the New Madison Approach has only been given through a series of 
speeches.260 When a consensus has been reached, rulemaking can be pursued so 
that the public is put on notice of what the law is in this area. 
Guidelines or policy statements of either the FTC or DOJ do not have the 
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force of law when they have not undergone rule-making procedures.261 
However, it is not always clear that guidance documents are not substantive 
rules.262 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) also provides for the 
precedential effect of opinions, statements of policy, or interpretation.263 In 
addition, agencies must be mindful of the Accardi doctrine, which provides that 
agencies are obligated to follow their own procedures or regulations.264 
The DOJ-FTC have already issued joint “Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property” in 2017 to guide the public about when 
anticompetitive conduct can be found in the licensing of intellectual property.265 
The guidelines state that intellectual property is considered the same as any other 
form of property for the antitrust analysis.266 While patents can confer market 
power, market power does not violate antitrust law if that power derives from “a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”267 The guidelines 
describe the markets affected by licensing, and general principles and their 
application in evaluating license agreements using the rule of reason.268 With 
respect to the fourth element of the New Madison Approach, the guidelines state, 
“Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an 
obligation to license the use of that property to others.”269 However, as discussed 
above, this is not a necessary result and exceptions may be possible.270 
Furthermore, the guidelines do not directly address standard-essential patents 
within the context of standard-setting organizations. As technology progresses 
and SSOs become more prevalent, clear policy is needed.   
In response to the debate and withdrawal from the 2013 Joint Policy 
Statement, the USPTO, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
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(“NIST”), and the DOJ Antitrust Division issued a new 2019 Policy 
Statement.271 Good-faith negotiations between patent owners and licensees are 
expected, but injunctions should be available for patent infringement as the facts 
warrant, with no special rules for standard essential patents.272 The 2019 Policy 
Statement reiterates that a balanced approach, accounting for all remedies, will 
preserve competition and provide incentives to innovate.273 A USPTO press 
release quotes Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and 
Director of the USPTO Andrei Iancu stating, “The new joint statement 
effectively takes the government’s thumb off the scale” and is meant to 
“incentivize technological development and growth of standards-based 
industries.”274 
This is a fair debate, but the enforcement agencies are in a unique position to 
drive the discussion towards the best solution. A faithful effort now to gather 
public input will help ensure that any guidelines and policy statements are likely 
to be accepted.275 That way, policy and guidelines can remain valuable and 
withstand the test of time.276 
By coming together with the DOJ, stakeholders can send a strong statement 
to the world that the patent system is strong and open to all inventors in the 
world. The role of antitrust law in the patent system must be clear. It is not one 
to be shuttered away but approached on a case-by-case basis, as the facts and 
circumstances demand. 
America’s inventors and those who invest in patented technology in America 
deserve clarity, a strong intellectual property system, and a strong antitrust 
system. Antitrust enforcers, innovators, and implementers can and must all work 
together to better our society. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law and antitrust law can work together to promote 
innovation that increases consumer welfare. However, antitrust law should not 
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be short-sighted and look for short term rewards. Having a variety of remedies 
available, including injunctions, ensures that parties will negotiate in good faith 
and abide by their commitments over time. The New Madison Approach is a 
necessary debate; further discussion and analysis will ensure that policy and 
guidelines that stand the test of time can be developed. Innovation is necessary 
at the cutting edge, creating new products in an unpredictable time frame. This 
demands flexibility to ensure that the society can reap the greatest benefit 
possible. Antitrust law should also address patent hold-up and hold-out, 
injunctions, and unilateral refusal to license with clear policy. Ultimately, 
society will reap the benefits of an appropriate approach to these bodies of law. 
 
